Your OAuth Consent Grants Are the New Authentication Bypass
Login-centric detection is blind here by design. Both campaigns operate after a valid token is issued, inside sessions telemetry treats as legitimate.
ShinyHunters ran mid-2025 through mid-2026 against retail, education and manufacturing. Operators posed as IT support and vished employees into approving an attacker-controlled connected app impersonating Salesforce Data Loader. The app inherited user permissions and ran high-volume API exports. No re-authentication. No MFA prompt. Microsoft documents three distinct attack paths. None is a Salesforce platform flaw.
The parallel Entra ID campaign hits Azure tenants now. Attackers spoof legitimate Microsoft OAuth client IDs and POST credentials to the token endpoint via the Resource Owner Password Credentials (ROPC) flow. That validates stolen credentials at scale and skips interactive sign-in logging. The only footprint in default logs is sign-ins with blank application IDs and AADSTS700016 errors. The AADSTS error family also leaks whether username, password, and conditional access each pass. That is a free credential-triage oracle.
None of the three top campaigns this cycle required a CVE. Login-event detection misses all of them.
This ties to the WorkOS Pipes and 'Login with ChatGPT' items. OAuth consent and token brokering are becoming the primary bypass class. Consent-grant monitoring is absent by default in most tenants.
What to do
Hunt Entra ID sign-in logs today for blank application IDs and AADSTS700016 errors, and disable the ROPC flow tenant-wide wherever not explicitly required
Inventory all Salesforce and M365 connected apps this sprint, revoke unused or over-permissioned OAuth grants, and flag any app impersonating Data Loader
Enable consent-grant and OAuth client-ID anomaly monitoring in your IdP and enforce conditional access to blunt validated-credential reuse