Software Credit at 90¢ While AI-as-Bundle Prints 32% Growth — The Mispricing Is Two-Directional
The Dislocation
Software-backed loans are trading at roughly 90 cents on the dollar and now account for about 35% of all distressed loans, which would be a coherent story if default rates had moved. They have not. The gap between how the paper prices and how the underlying cash flows behave is the widest it has been in years. Thoma Bravo walking away from Medallia — the $6.4B take-private from 2021 — is the clean proof that the leveraged SaaS buyout playbook, or rather the version of it that assumed cheap debt forever, has broken. Debt service went from $100M to $300M on floating-rate terms, multiples compressed, and AI disruption made the exit math unworkable. Blackstone declined to extend a lifeline.
The PE software-buyout model is not returning in the shape it left. Two of its three legs, cheap debt and cooperative exit multiples, have stopped functioning.
The Counter-Signal Nobody Expected
In the same week Atlassian reaccelerated revenue from 23% to 32% YoY and the stock ripped 24% after-hours out of a 57% YTD drawdown, which is a lot of movement for a name the market had collectively decided was roadkill. The driver is that Rovo customers generate 2x the ARR of non-Rovo customers. That is the cleanest public proof point on offer that AI bundled into existing SaaS as a premium tier drives expansion rather than displacement. The 'AI kills SaaS' thesis has been compressing enterprise software multiples for six quarters. It just took its most direct hit.
Why Both Directions Matter
The mispricing is running in both directions at once. On credit, performing SaaS loans with workflow-of-record positioning and real data moats are being marked next to the Medallia-adjacent paper that genuinely deserves distressed treatment. On equity, public software multiples sit depressed under the AI-displacement narrative that Atlassian's print just partially retracted, and those depressed public comps are anchoring private AI-application valuations below where the mobile-cycle analogy says they should eventually trade.
The a16z lens is the useful historical frame. The mobile cycle ran about five years from picks-and-shovels (Qualcomm/ARM) to application winners (Uber/Airbnb/Instagram), and we are roughly two years into the AI equivalent. Private AI-application positions taken now sit roughly two to three years ahead of where public markets will eventually mark them, if the analogy holds. It may not. Analogies rarely do at the edges.
What To Own vs. What To Avoid
| Own | Avoid |
|---|---|
| Performing SaaS loans at 85-92¢ with workflow-of-record moats | Survey, feedback, forms, basic analytics, rules-based workflow |
| Private AI apps at Series B/C with $5-25M ARR and data moats | AI wrappers without proprietary data or distribution |
| Enterprise SaaS with AI-bundle upside (Rovo template) | Floating-rate debt above 3x EBITDA with AI exposure |
The Risk
The honest caveat is that the dislocation could deepen before the picking pays, and patient capital tends to discover it was less patient than it advertised. Jones's 252% market-cap-to-GDP ratio, against 170% in 2000, means the macro will not help with timing. The position that survives both a compression scenario and a recovery is long performing-SaaS credit, long private AI apps, short AI-exposed leveraged SaaS, and prioritizing DPI over TVPI markups in every LP conversation.
What to do
Stand up a software-credit opportunistic sleeve targeting performing SaaS loans at 85-92¢; screen out AI-exposed categories (survey, analytics, rules-based workflow)
Audit every PE secondary and portco position with >3x debt/EBITDA for AI-disruption exposure using the Medallia template
Screen enterprise SaaS portfolio companies against the Rovo template — identify who can drive 2x ARR lift via AI-tier attach rates
Bias LP communications toward DPI over TVPI mark-ups through Q3 2026