Three Security Vulnerabilities You Must Address This Week — One Is Already Being Exploited
CVE-2026-29000: pac4j JWT Forgery via Public RSA Keys
This is maximum-severity, pre-authentication, internet-facing, and has a public proof-of-concept. The pac4j Java security library accepts JWTs signed with HS256 using the public RSA key as the HMAC secret when it should only accept RS256 signatures verified against that public key. This is a well-known algorithm confusion vulnerability class (see Auth0's 2015 advisory), but the fact it's appearing in a widely-used library integrated into hundreds of packages in 2026 is alarming. The patches shipped within two days, which is commendable — but the real risk window is right now, between PoC publication and widespread patching.
If pac4j is three layers deep in your dependency graph behind a framework adapter, you might not even know you're affected. This is precisely the scenario where SBOM generation pays for itself.
Run mvn dependency:tree -Dincludes=org.pac4j and equivalent Gradle commands. Check fat JARs and shaded dependencies where the package name may be relocated.
MCP Authorization Is Broken by Design — Not by Implementation
Doyensec published a comprehensive attack surface map of MCP's OAuth 2.0 and JAG (Identity Assertion JWT Authorization Grant) model. Four structural flaws make production MCP deployments provably insecure:
- No token revocation path for misbehaving agents — compromised agents retain access until token expiry
- LLM-driven scope escalation without user consent — the scope negotiation layer is LLM-influenceable
- Undefined client credential issuance enabling namespace collision and resource identifier injection
- ID-JAG replay amplifies blast radius across multiple MCP access tokens
Confirmed CVEs already exist: CVE-2025-53100 and CVE-2025-53818 for command injection, CVE-2025-4144 and CVE-2025-4143 for SSO metadata manipulation. DNS rebinding against unauthenticated localhost WebSocket servers rounds out the attack surface. These aren't bugs to patch — they're design gaps in a spec being deployed to production today.
Copilot Agent Weaponized as Zero-Click Exfil Channel
CVE-2026-26144 turns Microsoft's Copilot Agent into a data exfiltration tool via an Excel information-disclosure flaw. The attack requires zero user interaction. The blast radius is everything the Copilot Agent can read — which, by design, is broad. This is the 'confused deputy' problem applied to AI assistants: a traditional flaw lets an attacker hijack the agent's execution context, and the agent's ambient permissions amplify the damage.
Two additional Office RCEs (CVE-2026-26110, CVE-2026-26113) are exploitable through the preview pane alone — a malicious document in your inbox or shared Teams channel executes code before anyone deliberately opens it. Automated document processing pipelines are also attack surfaces.
Every organization rolling out AI copilots needs to treat the agent's permission model as a security-critical architecture decision, not an IT configuration checkbox.
What to do
Run transitive dependency scan for pac4j across all Java services and apply patches for CVE-2026-29000 today
Apply March 2026 Patch Tuesday with priority on CVE-2026-26144 (Copilot exfil), CVE-2026-26110 and CVE-2026-26113 (Office preview pane RCE) by end of week
Implement compensating MCP authorization controls this sprint: mTLS between agents and MCP servers, per-tool resource namespacing, centralized token revocation, and explicit user consent gates for high-risk tool invocations
Audit Copilot Agent permission scoping — agents should not have ambient read access to all documents a user can access
Keep SBOM generation in CI/CD even though federal requirements were rescinded this week — use it for sub-hour CVE enumeration